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The UK Government has been designing a new Electronic
Identity Management (eIDM) system that, once rolled–out,
will take over how citizens authenticate against online public
services. This system, Gov.UK Verify, has been promoted
as a state–of–the–art privacy–preserving system, tailored to
meet the requirements of UK citizens and is the first eIDM
interoperability in which the government does not act as
an identity provider itself, delegating the provision of iden-
tity to competing third parties. According to the recently
enacted EU eIDAS Regulation, member states can allow
their citizens to transact with foreign services by notifying
their national eID scheme. Once a scheme is notified, all
other member states are obligated to incorporate it into their
electronic identification procedures. The UK Government
is contemplating at the moment whether it would be ben-
eficial to notify. This article examines Gov.UK Verify ’s
compliance with the requirements set forth by the Regula-
tion and the impact on privacy and data protection. It then
explores potential interoperability issues with other national
eID schemes, using the German nPA, an eIDM based on
national identity cards, as a reference point. The article
highlights areas of attention, should the UK decide to notify
Gov.UK Verify. It also contributes to relevant literature of
privacy–preserving eID management by offering policy and
technical recommendations for compliance with the new Reg-
ulation and an evaluation of interoperability under eIDAS
between systems of different architecture.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As online services increasingly complement or substitute
traditional ones, public and private sectors are expressing an
interest in electronic identity management systems (eIDM).
eIDM offers to the public sector a trusted equivalent of phys-
ical identification of citizens, a necessary requirement for
many eGovernment services. At the same time, private ser-
vices may also benefit from online trustworthy civil identities
(e.g. banks, public transport services). In the European
Union (EU), the Regulation on Electronic Identification and
Trust Services (eIDAS) was adopted recently, as part of the
Digital Economy agenda.1 It establishes a common frame-
work for interoperation of eIDM across all member states.
Interoperation is not mandatory. Instead, national eIDMs
that are to be used across borders have to follow a notifica-
tion process. Though the scope of the Regulation concerns
public services, the Commission hopes that it will inform
private sector initiatives.2
eIDM systems allow identification and authentication of
users to online services by the use of software (username/
password) or hardware (cards, mobile devices) tokens.3 Tra-
1Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of 23 July 2014 on electronic
identification and trust services for electronic transactions
in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC
[2014] OJ L257/73





3Authentication is the process by which a person proves a
claim to an entity. For example, A proves to B that A is an
adult. Identification is a subset of authentication. Identifica-
tion connects a person to an identity, i.e. A proves to B that
they are A. An identity normally includes multiple claims
(e.g. name, date of birth, address), enough to unambiguously
verify an individual.
ditional eIDM architectures involved a central entity that
served as an Identity Provider (IdP) to multiple Service
Providers (SP). Later systems consider central storage of
eIDs as a privacy risk and employ federated architectures to
distribute users’ personal data across multiple IdP/storage
locations [22]. Modern deployment attempts to re–introduce
elements of control of the electronic identity (eID) back to
the users [18].
Most member states in the EU have already deployed, or
are currently deploying, national eIDM systems. Implemen-
tations vary across the Union, from centralised architectures
(such as in Estonia), where the Government serves as a cen-
tral IdP, to user–centric deployments with users acting as
their own IdPs (such as in Germany). National eIDMs are
qualitatively different from private eIDMs, as they offer eIDs
that are validated against official identity records.
The UK Government has recently introduced its eIDM
system, currently in public beta. The UK system, named
Gov.UK Verify aims to create an eID market: users authen-
ticate to online public SPs through private entities that act
as IdPs. The UK, therefore, reverses existing national eID
paradigms as, instead of renting validated eIDs to the private
sector, it rents (officially) validated eIDs from the private
sector. The innovative architecture promises complete sepa-
ration of eIDs from SPs or the state. The goal is to prohibit
linkability of the different uses of an eID across services,
which may lead to unwanted profiling of the user.
The goal of this article is to provide a comprehensive anal-
ysis of Gov.UK Verify against the requirements set forth
by the EU eIDAS Regulation. Although the UK has not
yet announced intentions to notify its scheme, allowing UK
eIDs to be used across borders in all European governmental
services could add immense value to the aforementioned eID
marketplace. To succeed though, consequences of notification
should be carefully considered. The paper is organised as
follows: Section 2 details the methodology used and related
work on the field. Section 3 provides an overview of Gov.UK
Verify. An analysis of the Regulation is provided in section 4.
Finally, section 5.1 examines compliance with eIDAS and
the impact on privacy and data protection.4 Section 5.2
looks upon potential issues of interoperability with other
European systems, using the German eIDM as a reference
point. Suggested interoperabilitys and policy measures are
offered at the end of both sections.
2. METHODOLOGYANDRELATEDWORK
This paper draws upon empirical data and findings from
prior research on eIDM systems, and in particular on various
European projects and the limited research out there on
Gov.UK Verify. It then relates the findings to relevant law,
by following legal research methodologies. Doctrinal research
is used to screen legislation and case law and discover the
scope and aim behind legal descriptions [16]. Law is referred
to in this article as a synthesis of hard (national and Euro-
pean legislation) and soft law (quasi-legal instruments such
as codes of conduct, EU guidelines and communication). The
4It must be noted that personal data are clearly distinguished
from the notion of privacy, which is wider. eIDAS only
addresses eIDs in terms of personal data protection. This
paper touches upon privacy when discussing aspects of the
system architecture but references to the Regulation are
focused on personal data.
paper uses this synthesised framework to highlight inconsis-
tencies of the system in question (Gov.UK Verify) with the
regulation and propose suggestions to mitigate them.
A comparison of past European projects about interop-
erability of eIDs can be found in [27]. Analysis of ‘Secure
Identity across Borders Linked’ (STORK), a large scale pan–
European pilot aiming to test an interoperability infrastruc-
ture across Europe can be found in [19]. The project defined
4 security levels of identification (Quality Authentication
Assurance or QAA). QAA were based on level of certainty of
the identification, with the highest level being equivalent to a
traditional physical identification. Three of them were later
used as a reference point in eIDAS Levels of Assurance.5
It also successfully implemented two different architectural
designs, a middleware to communicate with foreign identifi-
cation services and a Pan–European Proxy Service (PEPS)
which acted as a getaway for foreign eIDs. Roßnagel et al.
in [33] examine the new criteria set by Privacy by Design
principles, namely unlinkability, transparency and interven-
ability which will be mentioned in the analysis of Gov.UK
Verify below. Privacy by Design derives from Cavoukian’s
work on the Laws of Identity [11]. Details of what should be
the minimum dataset necessary for identification according
to case of use are provided in [32].
[23] explore the concept of eIDAS Assurance Levels in two
international standards. After analysing Level 1 (the pro-
vided identity is a valid identity and it is possible it belongs
to the user) and 2 (the provided identity fully identifies the
person it relates to and it is probable it belongs to the user),
the authors propose that a new intermediate level would be
most appropriate for the majority of business cases, in terms
of cost and technology investments required. Jøsang in [21]
offers a breakdown of different user authentication schemes,
finding that Assurance Levels are overall harmonized across
national and international schemes. The paper concludes,
though, that the assurance offered only works one way, as in
most schemes users have no ability to verify back the service
they transact with.
For the legal treatment of electronic identities in the UK,
see [30] where it is proposed that inadequate protection of
electronic identities should be supplemented by borrowing
identity rights from civil law.
3. GOV.UK VERIFY
3.1 eID Policy in the UK
Contrary to the majority of countries in the EU, United
Kingdom does not have a national identity card scheme in
place. Citizens prove their identity by alternative identifi-
cation documents, such as passports and driving licenses.
This is largely attributed to the bad connotations centrally
issued ID cards still have: the UK had introduced national
identity card schemes twice before, during the two World
Wars, where the ID cards were used for conscription purposes.
Since this use was against the principles the schemes were
created on, national ID cards were regarded as a means to
monitor population activity [2].
Perhaps unsurprisingly, later attempts to introduce manda-
tory ID cards failed: 2010 saw the deprecation of the Identity
5See table 1 below.
Cards Act,6 that never got implemented due to strong oppo-
sition. The Act provided for a mandatory ID card roll–out in
two stages, first to non–EU residents and at a later date to all.
The card would contain an identifying set (full name, address,
date of birth) as well as biometric data including a head and
shoulders photograph as per the ePassport specifications.
The biometrics along with an electronic representation of
the identifiers would be stored in an electronic chip that
would make them available for identification, authorization
an electronic signing. Each card had a unique serial number,
which along with the rest of information would be stored in a
central government database, the National Identity Register.
A simple biometric scan, or request from the serial number,
would retrieve the information from the database. The regis-
ter, and especially its unique serial number, was considered
means of potential mass–surveillance and a hit to privacy and
was destroyed in 2010, with the Identity Documents Act.7
Consequent interoperabilitys for an eID focused on software
tokens instead of physical cards and examined approaches
where eIDs would not be under sole central control of the
Government — which was hoped to be more in accord with
the spirit of common law tradition.
Central role in the design of the new eID scheme is played
by the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) that transposes the
EU Data Protection Directive to English law. The DPA reg-
ulates the processing of all personal data and introduces to
the legal landscape important concepts about data minimiza-
tion, purpose limitations and data subjects consent. This is
an important inclusion, since concepts of privacy protection
have been traditionally absent from UK common law.8 The
DPA does not include all provisions of the EU Directive and
many passages have been kept purposefully vague. As with
many UK policies, it focuses on a goal oriented approach to
data protection rather than details on how to achieve them
[31]; instead the Act gets supplemented by explanations on
practical applications from the Information Commissioner.
In 2013, the Government published its new Digital Strat-
egy.9 Part of it was a ’Digital by default’ plan, according to
which all central government services should focus on online
operation first, aiming to drive most citizens’ interactions
with the state online. As more services would be transferred
online, creation of a scheme that could verify the identity
and claims of citizens became imperative. Towards that end,
and having in mind people’s attitudes towards Governmen-
tal identification schemes, the Government Digital Service
(the department in charge of digital strategies) set up an
62006 c 15
72010 c 40
8UK law does not include a positive right to privacy. Data
protection differs significantly to privacy: Privacy refers to
every kind of possession of information whereas data protec-
tion is only concerned with the disclosure of that information.
As a result, there is no effective redress in a case of a breach
of privacy, such as injunctions or adequate compensation.
Lately, the courts have started to protect private information
by joining the tort of breach of confidence with the provisions
of arts 8 and 10 ECHR to compensate. For more see I. Lloyd,
“Anonymity and the Law in the United Kingdom”, in Lessons
From the Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy and Identity
in A Networked Society, I. Kerr, C. Lucock, and V. Steeves,
Editors. 2009, Oxford University Press.
9Cabinet Office, “Government Digital Strategy: Decem-
ber 2013”. 2013, available from: https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/government-digital-strategy/
government-digital-strategy [accessed 14 October 2015]
advisory group that would explore and inform Government
Digital Service about the principles that the system should
be designed on.10
The Privacy Consumer Advisory Group came up with 9
Identity Assurance Principles (IdAP) that the system should
be built upon, data minimization and user control among
them. The principles form the bare minimum of how the
system should operate. It should be noted that the princi-
ples are again target goals; they do not address legality or
enforcement of policies — instead they specify technological
interoperabilitys that would serve these principles by design.
The model is based around server hub and spoke authenti-
cation using username/password software tokens. Instead
of electronic identity management, design moved towards
identity assurance: the system should offer different levels of
certainty about one’s identity. It would be organized around
risk–based assessment of identity assurance.11 Identity As-
surance is considered to be more consumer–led in focus, with
no need of central databases, extensive data sharing or data
consolidation [13].
Reversing the aims of the deprecated Identity Cards Act,
where the Government would be the only IdP, the new scheme
aimed to create a private market of IdPs, with the aspiration
that consumers would be able to choose which entity they
trust more to handle their identification. It would also allow
users to manage multiple electronic identities, having different
accounts with separate providers. This way a user can choose
where to deploy each identity and for which use.
Multiple IdPs also assists against data aggregation: iden-
tity data get split across different small databases of each
IdP, mitigating the risk of a single point of failure.
Finally, design was kept in line with the general technology–
agnostic principle of the ’Digital by Default’ strategy: the
specification does not constrain the providers in the technol-
ogy they wish to implement, as long as a translation layer
exists, specified by the Government Digital Service, to allow
inter–communication.
3.2 Overview of the system
3.2.1 System components
To avoid privacy concerns of a centrally operated system,
Gov.UK Verify moves to a federated approach of handling
digital identities. There is no single Unique Identifier for
users. It is instead comprised of four different elements that
operate separately from each other:
(1) Central Hub: An online central hub (CH) mediates
all interactions across the different components and
the users. The hub acts as a broker to ensure that
identification and authentication exchanges are sealed
from the parties, offering higher security, privacy and
usability.
(2) Service Providers (SP): Service providers are the




11Not all transactions require the same level of certainty about
somebody’s identity. Some only require authentication of an
attribute (i.e. that a person is above 18 years old to access
age–restricted content).
users to allow them further access. SPs are not part of
the system, strictly speaking; instead they are contrac-
tors who lease the use of the system for their services.
At the moment, SPs are solely governmental depart-
ments [12].
(3) Identity Providers (IdP): IdPs are commercial com-
panies, that users contract with, who verify a user’s
information against various authoritative sources (at
the moment the National Passports Office and Driving
Licensing Authority (DVLA)) and set up accounts on
their databases of persistent digital identities of their
users.
(4) Matching Service (MS): the MS is a middleware
between the SP and IdP. The MS is operated by the
SP and is built with an adapter provided by the Gov-
ernment Digital Service. Its goal is to match up the
persistent digital identity of the user, sent by the IdP,
to a local account in the SP’s database.
3.2.2 Authentication process and protocols
Figure 1: Identification transaction in Gov.UK Verify
Whenever a user wishes to log in to a service, the SP
contacts the CH asking for verification of the user provided
information. The CH redirects to the user’s browser with
a list of IdPs. After selection, the CH relays the request
to the chosen IdP, withholding any information about the
SP. If this is a new user, the IdP checks the information
they provided against Passport Office or DVLA. An interme-
diary service, called ’Document Checking Service’, assures
that the IdP has access to only the necessary information
— IdPs receive a strictly Yes/No answer from governmental
departments, without having to share information directly.
If the information provided is correct, the IdP creates an eID
containing a minimum dataset (MDS)12 and any additional
attributes. The MDS is then sent to the CH. The CH cre-
ates a pseudonymized record that it then sends to the SP.
The SP needs to have a local translator (MS) set–up that
will associate the pseudonymized account received to a local
account on the SP’s service. All assertions are facilitated
through SAML 2.0, an XML–based protocol that facilitates
authentication through a web–browser [10]. Figure 1 shows
the process diagrammatically.
12or Matching Dataset, comprised of full name, date of birth,
gender, current and previous address [10].
The interference of the CH between the SPs and IdPs, satisfies
the privacy principles about minimisation of data transfers,
allowing data processing inside silos without leakage of data
from SPs to IdPs or vice–versa. Compared to federated ap-
proaches implemented in other countries, where the central
hub communicates directly with the SPs and IdPs without a
matching service, the programme satisfies stricter security
and privacy criteria.13
4. THE EIDAS REGULATION
In 2012 a draft Regulation was proposed to revise the pre-
vious eSignatures Directive. The proposed Regulation was
adopted by the Parliament and the Council in 2014. eIDAS14
aims to offer a comprehensive legal framework that will boost
mutual recognition and inter–operation of cross–border eID
management, trust services and certificates. The Regulation
is part of a series of reforms in line with the Commission’s
‘Digital Agenda’ which pushes for a unified internal mar-
ket across all member states.15 Though the main aim of
the Regulation is to manage electronic seals, time stamps,
certificate services for website authentication and electronic
documents and their delivery, eID management had to be
addressed first as it would allow authentication to all other
services. eIDAS defines an interoperability framework of na-
tional eIDMs. Minimum specifications are not defined by the
Regulation, but are included in subsequent implementation
acts.16 Member states that wish to operate cross-border
transactions through their schemes need to notify their na-
tional eID interoperability to the Commission. Notification
is not obligatory and can only happen for national schemes
(either public sector schemes or private schemes officially
recognised by the state) that are used to identify citizens at
at least one public service.17 Successful notification comes af-
ter a lengthy deliberation process where member states make
(non–binding) suggestions on the eID scheme in question.18
Upon acceptance of the notified scheme, all other member
states are obliged to incorporate it into their authentication
services.19
4.1 eID Requirements under eIDAS and im-
plementation acts
In terms of requirements, eIDAS specifies that all schemes
must adhere to the Data Protection Directive (DPD).20 A
13For example, see US’s FCCX, where the MS component is
absent: https://gcn.com/articles/2013/08/22/usps-fccx.aspx
14Footnote 1 above.
15European Commission, ‘Annual Growth Survey’ Brussels,
28112012, COM(2012) 750 final.
16Note that under §27 of the eIDAS preamble, it is stated
that “This Regulation should be technology-neutral. The
legal effects it grants should be achievable by any technical
means provided that the requirements of this Regulation
are met”. In contrast, the implementing acts point towards
specific implementations, creating thus de facto standards
(see for example Annex in IR 2015/1501 OJ L 235/2015).
17eIDAS arts 7 and 9
18Note that the member state is free to disregard all com-
ments and that the Commission has no real power to deny
notification of a scheme, unless the application is obviously
fraudulent or faulty.
19eIDAS art 6
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3 2 3 ‘Substantial’ Paying online.
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to a valid identity
and (b) the iden-
tity belongs to the
person presenting
the ePassport.
Table 1: Mapping of national assurance levels to STORK
and eIDAS
specific mention is made to the data minimization prin-
ciple, with services required to request and process only
data strictly necessary for each individual authentication.21
Schemes are also required to adhere to ‘Privacy by Design’
principles, meaning that privacy cannot be dealt with only
by policy — privacy should be aided by technological means
on the design of the system. Finally, system design should
by technology–neutral, referring to specific technologies only
when that is absolutely essential for the security of the system
or the users.22
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data [1995] OJ L281/0031
21eIDAS recital 11 and art 12
22The first drafts of the Regulation required member states to
operate schemes that could guarantee that no extra hardware
The Regulation focuses on identification in expense of
authentication; it specifies that the goal is ‘unambiguous
representation’ of a person23. Implementation act 2015/1501
clarifies this further in the design of the inter–operation
framework.24 According to it, persons are unambiguously
identified by transmission of a minimal dataset, which should
include a Persistent Unique Identifier (UID).25 Though iden-
tification is a sub–section of authentication, it entails the
creation of a unique link to a specific user, disallowing the
use of more privacy-preserving authentication methods (e.g.
age–restricted services that do not require to identify users
could be satisfied by Yes/No answers to questions about legal
age). In this respect, the Regulation has been criticised for
offering less privacy than what is technically possible [24].
eIDAS further specifies a common reference of identity as-
surance levels that notified schemes should adhere to. Using
the STORK project as a reference point,26 eIDAS defines
named assurance levels, low — substantial — high (table 1).
Definition of the levels comes with the implementation act
2015/150227 where ‘Low’ is assigned when evidence are ‘as-
sumed’ to be valid, ‘Substantial’ after validation of the evi-
dence and ‘High’ after biometric validation. eIDAS stipulates
that member states are free to deny foreign schemes access
to services of a higher assurance level than the scheme.28
4.2 Interoperability framework under eIDAS
Anticipating that notified schemes will differ in architec-
ture, the eIDAS Task Force produced implementing act 2015/
1501 [17]. The act is a technical specification aiming to pro-
vide interoperabilitys of interoperability between all possible
combinations of eIDM architectures. The specification de-
scribes two options of deploying an eIDM system to receiving
member states: The system can operate either as a proxy or
as middleware.
or software would be necessary in order for other member
states to access them. This wording has been toned down
in the final text after objections from some member states.
See C. Cuijpers and J. Schroers, “eIDAS as guideline for the
development of a pan European eID framework in FutureID”,
in Open Identity Summit 2014, D. Hu¨hnlein, Editor. 2014,
Bonner Ko¨llen Verlag. p. 23-38.
23eIDAS art 3(1)
24 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1501 of
8 September 2015 on the interoperability framework pur-
suant to Article 12(8) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of
the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in
the internal market OJ L 235/2015, ANNEX 1, pp. 1–6
25See art 11(1) and ANNEX 1 footnote 24 above.
26STORK defined 4 assurance levels, with 1 being
“no assurance” and 4 “high assurance”. See STORK.
“D2.3 – Quality authenticator scheme”. 2009; Available
from: https://www.eid-stork.eu/index.php?option=com
processes&Itemid=&act=streamDocument&did=577 [Ac-
cessed: 2 January 2016]. eIDAS is using STORK levels
2 to 4.
27Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1502 of
8 September 2015 on setting out minimum technical speci-
fications and procedures for assurance levels for electronic
identification means pursuant to Article 8(3) of Regulation
(EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council on electronic identification and trust services for elec-
tronic transactions in the internal market, OJ L 235/2015,
ANNEX 2, pp. 7–20.
28eIDAS art 6(1c)
As a proxy, the system is deployed as a central server
based and operated by the notifying member state. Foreign
member states will subsequently send authentication requests
to that server, who then redirects to the local eIDM system
to perform the identification. The local system sends the
server the result of the identification that is then redirected
by the server to the foreign member state.
Alternatively the notifying member state can create a
standalone server which will be based and operated by the
receiving member state at the same level as the local eIDM
system. When the receiving member state needs to identify a
foreign user, the identification will go through the standalone
server and its result will be redirected back to the local
system.
Regardless of choice, the proxy or middleware will relay
information to the national eID scheme of the receiving
member state through an interoperability software. A choice
on deployment of the interoperability software is given as well.
Receiving member states can install the software centrally,
so that all SP requests go through the same instance of
interoperability software. Obviously this works better in
architectures with a centralised element, such as a central
hub. Or, the member state can choose to install an instance
of the software at every individual SP, if communication with
a central element is absent or needs to be avoided.
All communication between the different components is
facilitated by the SAML protocol.29 A (simplified) represen-


























Receiving Member State Notifying Member State
Figure 2: Configuration options for interoperable systems
5. COMPLIANCE AND INTEROPERABIL-
ITY
Since the scheme is fairly recent and its operation is still
in beta, a perfect assessment of its characteristics is difficult.
Instead, the discussion that follows will focus on how certain
technical decisions reflect on the current regulating frame-
work around digital identity. Where appropriate, reference
is made to the German eID scheme for comparison. A brief
overview of the German scheme can be found in appendix A.
29Implying, therefore, that since communication happens
through web browser requests, the more components are
involved the slower the whole process becomes.
5.1 Compliance with national and European
laws
5.1.1 Pseudonymity under IdAP
Upon request of verification of an identity from the CH,
the IdP authenticates the user via username/password, as-
sociates the username with other identifiers of the same
user (e.g. name or date of birth) and then derives a user
pseudonym that it transmits to the CH. Each pseudonym
is persistent across each CH (and there is no premise to
assume there are more than one CH). The CH then as-
signs a new pseudonym to this pseudonymised record in
order to hide from the SP the activity of the IdP (edge–
unlinkability). This happens inside the MS. The MS is a
middleware, provided by the Government Digital Service but
operated at the SP level. The MS receives the pseudonymised
record from the CH. The record, as noted previously, con-
tains the Matching (or minimum) Dataset (MDS)30 under a
pseudonym. After assigning a new pseudonym to the MDS,
the MS tries to match it with a local record of the SP. The
process has three possible cycles, depending how success-
ful initial matching is. At the lowest cycle, the MS uses
the MDS to search for a matching local record. If found,
it associates the record to the pseudonym on a table. If
not, the next cycles widen the search criteria to the point of
asking the user of additional information.31 Since Gov.UK
Verify does not seem to support selective disclosure [4], it
is safe to assume that the MDS is always transferred to
and from the CH. On top of the original identifiers, the
MDS will get enriched by user provided attributes, in case
of a failed attempt to match the local records.32 In the
end, the MS creates an association table, storing the re-
ceived pseudonyms and matching datasets to the local ac-
counts of the SP. The pseudonym assigned by the MS is
persistent. This is in order to avoid having to follow the
same process every time: the MS needs to associate the
IdP account to a local one only the first time; by keep-
ing the pseudonyms static each subsequent time the MS
knows to which local account the eID refers to. But this
also means that if more than one SP access the same MS,
they will all receive the same pseudonym for each eID. Since
the MS is deployed at the SP level, there is no telling of
how many different MS exist. If the same pseudonym as-
30See footnote 12.
31If no match is found after the first 2 cycles, the system
employs input from the user to help determine a match.
In cycle 3 the system asks the user for additional in-
formation, through the Gov.UK Verify Hub. The exam-
ple given by the Government Digital Service is the abil-
ity of the user to input their Unique Taxpayer Reference
when trying to access tax services. The requested in-
formation differs for every SP and is determined by the
SP’s policy: http://alphagov.github.io/identity-assurance-
documentation/ downloads/Build matching service.pdf
32The specification requires additional user consent to be
given in case an attribute provider is involved to enrich
the MDS, but user consent can be assumed if the user is
the source of the attributes. The CH is forbidden by the
policy to store any other information than the MDS and
the association of pseudonyms: Cabinet Office, “Identity
Assurance Hub Service SAML 2.0 Profile v1.1a”. 2013;
Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment data/file/458610/Identity
Assurance Hub Service Profile v1.2a.pdf [Accessed: 16
January 2016]
signed to a user is shared by more than one SP, it effec-
tively allows the pseudonym to function as a de facto UID
[4].
Existence of de facto UID would be hard to justify as long
as it remains undocumented.33 Federated architectures were
developed to function without need of global identifiers (or
transfer of identifiers across organisations) [28]. Perhaps the
Government Digital Service intended for a different MS at
every SP, in which case there is no risk of the described
behaviour. But since in theory combination of SPs under a
single MS is possible, the scheme and its regulation should
be updated to include this possibility (or its prevention).
The Government should update the policies that regulate
the relationship between CH, IdP and SP34 to account for
this use of pseudonyms as a known and intended function of
the system. It should also describe in detail the definition of a
SP. Detailing under which circumstances static pseudonyms
are permitted would allow the system to take advantage
of them in certain cases. For example, should the eIDAS
interoperability software be considered an SP (or many SPs
under one MS) would allow the system to accommodate the
UID function eIDAS requires (see below). This of course pre-
supposes that adequate risk assessment has been undertaken
beforehand.
5.1.2 Unique Identifiers under eIDAS
One of the Regulation’s requirements is the ‘unambiguous
representation’ of an individual.35 In other words, each
record is required to have a Unique Identifier associated with
it. This UID is expected as part of the mandatory minimum
dataset for natural persons.36
Gov.UK Verify does not include UID by design. In fact, it
was one of the design goals to avoid the feature that caused
the attempted National Register Database to fail (which
is why the system funcion described in section 5.1.1 is in
need of documentation and justification by the Government
Digital Service). Implementation of the CH in between IdP
and SP is to guarantee unlinkability — that a user cannot
be associated with a particular eID and activities of an
eID cannot be associated to each other. Unlinkability is
mandated by the Assurance Principles of ‘Minimisation’ and
‘Transparency’ that form the regulating policy of the whole
scheme.
The scheme does provide for a minimum dataset though.
Between IdP, CH and MS, eIDs are exchanged in the form of
a record with a set amount of attributes. The record contains
a pseudonym and the MDS. The MDS, in other words, is
33See also [4] where the authors conclude that persistent
pseudonyms and visibility of attributes (non–selective disclo-
sure) could lead to user impersonation by the CH, should
the CH become compromised.
34including the Framework Agreement and the Identity As-
surance Principles
35eIDAS art 3§1
36According to IR 2015/1501 the minimum dataset is com-
prised of at least First and Last Name(s), date of birth and
UID. It is unclear whether additional attributes are manda-
tory: the IR refers to additional attributes as an optional
set of which member states ‘must’ include one or more into
the minimum data set. In contrast, the eIDAS technical
specification refers to those attributes as optional depending
on availability and legality under national law.
the transaction identity [29].
Though the Regulation mandates that a UID is expected,
definition of the UID is up to the member state. Only re-
quirement is that it uniquely represents an individual across
a period of time. This freedom of interpretation led the
design team behind the nPA — the German eID scheme —
to assign as UID the Pseudonym created by the eID card as
described in appendix A [5].37
Gov.UK Verify could take advantage of the way pseudonymity
works under the present design to supply the required eIDAS
function. Since the CH (& the MS) has the ability to create
unique pseudonyms for each user, these could be used along
with the MDS to comprise eIDAS’ minimum dataset.
In order for this function to produce consistent pseudonyms
for each user every time a single MS must exist between CH
and SP (of the receiving member state). This means that
the UK will have to deploy its scheme to receiving member
states in the form of a proxy. A proxy would give the UK the
opportunity to operate one MS that could then transmit the
pseudonymised MDS across indefinite SPs.38 Obviously this
is a interoperability based on the way the system operates
in practice and does not seem to be currently in line with
what the design team intended. Support of this function
should, therefore, come after proper revision of the system
architecture.
5.1.3 Compliance with data protection
A general obligation set forth by eIDAS is that any setup
should be compliant to the Data Protection Directive.39
Accordingly, Gov.UK Verify as a whole is required to conform
to the requirements of the DPA.
According to the contractual agreement Gov.UK Verify
signs with each IdP, the CH is a data controller in respect to
the personal data that it processes.40 The DPA mandates
that in order for any processing to be fair and lawful, it needs
to be transparent and based on a legitimate interest. Though
there are other ways to ground a legitimate interest apart
from user consent, it has been accepted that in a transparent
processing users should be fully informed of the kind of
processing that is taking place [1]. The relevant privacy
policy does not enumerate the data collected in an exhaustive
way41 and contains no information on retention periods.42 It
37The legal implications of this decision have not yet been
challenged in a court. It is reminded that by ruling of the
German Constitutional Court in 1983, creation of any kind
of UID is forbidden: see footnote 56.
38A proxy based interoperability seems logical in any case,
considering that the CH is a centrally deployed key part of
the scheme. Perhaps central deployment of the CH and a
middleware offer of the MS would be possible, but in that
case each user would acquire a different pseudonym for each
MS.
39eIDAS recital 11
40Cabinet Office “Framework Agreement and Sched-
ules”. Draft v0,9 20 December 2014, 2014. Avail-
able at: http://data.gov.uk/data/contracts-finder-archive/
contract/1690273/ [accessed on: 21 August 2015]
41It contains the word ”including”, allowing for a wide inter-
pretation of the categories of data that follow as only a subset
of the collected information: https://www.signin.service.gov.
uk/privacy-notice
42The Government–Identity Provider agreement requires in-
formation to be provided by the IdP: https://data.gov.uk/
is certain that the CH (and the MS) stores at least a record of
received pseudonym and associated pseudonym to facilitate
linking of eIDs to local accounts [10]. No information is
given on users’ right to invoke their consent at any time. It
is unclear therefore what happens to the data held in the
CH in the case a user decides to close down an account with
an IdP.
Adding to the confusion, promotional material of the sys-
tem insist that no personal data are processed inside the
CH,43 creating questions about the specificity of user consent
to the processing, as blanket consent is not allowed under
the DPA,44 and about conformity with the Identity Principle
of Transparency in personal data processing.45
Clearer privacy policies on the exact processing that takes
place in the CH and MS would be of value to strengthen user
consent and specificity. In particular, privacy policies and
T&C of the CH, as well as the Framework Agreement be-
tween the parties should detail the processing of pseudonyms
inside the CH, the reasons, if any, that pseudonyms should
not be considered personal data46 and how the CH handles
the rest of identifiers in the MDS since selective disclosure is
not possible in the current system.
5.2 Interoperability issues
5.2.1 Liability under eIDAS
eIDAS provisions on liability pose an interesting complex-
ity: Even though liability for Trust Service Providers is
clearly defined,47 allocation of liability for eID schemes, ac-
cording to art 11, involves not only the parties that issue
and operate the eIDs but also the notifying member state.
The state of a notified scheme is liable for damages caused
intentionally or negligently to any natural or legal person
if the scheme fails to uniquely identify the individual or if
online authentication becomes unavailable. If the parties
issuing the identification means and operating the authen-
tication procedure are private providers, they have the right
to limit their liability through their T&C.48 In contrast, the
member state is always liable for damages and users cannot
limit their liability in case of machine malfunction or com-
promise [24]. In this power imbalance, there is a question
of why states would notify their schemes since that would
expose them to responsibilities for actions beyond their con-
data/contracts-finder-archive/contract/1690273/
43“We don’t keep your identity data centrally; in fact we don’t
keep it at all, or even get to see it ourselves: it is held by the
identity providers on your behalf.”: https://identityassurance.
blog.gov.uk/2014/11/05/tech-arch-privacy/
44The Information Commissioner refers back to the DPD art
7 to define consent and its parameters: https://ico.org.uk/
media/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection-2-2.pdf
45Details of the processing should be made publicly available
for all activities, including those regarding security of the
system, according to Identity Assurance Principle #2.
46It is highly doubtful that pseudonymous data could be
considered non personal data, especially under the light of
the new EU General Data Protection Regulation. For more,
see C. Burton, et al., ”The Final European Union General
Data Protection Regulation”. BNA Privacy & Security Law
Report, 2016. 15: 153
47eIDAS art 13
48eIDAS art 24(2d)
trol [15], such as when the system of a private company goes
oﬄine.
In light of the above, it seems that Gov.UK Verify should
revisit its relationship with participating entities. In Gov.UK
Verify, all interested parties (IdPs, authorities, SPs) have lim-
ited their liability with their inter-party agreements to a bare
minimum apart from cases of fraud or death.49 In domestic
transactions the Government has followed the same practice
in its relationship to the contracted IdPs and SPs under the
Framework Agreement. This practice is problematic, as in a
cross–border transaction the government would not be able
to waive its liability even though all other parties would.
The UK should consider amending its contractual obli-
gations to the other parties by including sets of minimum
liability limits for every party involved in a transaction and
with every possible scenario in mind.50
5.2.2 Levels of Assurance
As mentioned earlier, eIDAS Levels of Assurance (LoA)
have been informed by the four levels specified in the STORK
2.0 project. Although some national schemes, such as the
German nPA, support the STORK QAA 1 to 4, Gov.UK
Verify was designed to support up to QAA 3. Consequently,
in a cross–border scenario it always runs the risk of being
denied access to certain SPs; eIDAS specifies that member
states with a high LoA do not have to accommodate notifying
schemes that satisfy lower levels only. QAA 4 and consequent
LoA 3 ‘High’ require the presence of biometrics at the mo-
ment of authentication. For example, social security and tax
services in Hungary require biometric authentication under
the new eID card scheme.51 According to eIDAS, Hungary
will be free to deny access to its online tax services to UK
eIDs.
Incorporation of biometric authentication in a modular de-
sign such as Gov.UK Verify’s should be technically possible.
In fact, since the system was designed to specify target goals
rather than means of achieving them, the private IdP are in
principle free to use any technological means they wish. LoA
3 is specified in [9] as ‘Level Identity 4’. Accommodation
of biometrics, therefore, is up to the discretion of the IdP.
Careful consideration of how Gov.UK Verify and the CH will
handle biometric data is a matter of future work, if LoA 3
becomes available to the system.
49See for example Experian, T&C: https://www.
experianidentityservice.co.uk/Help/Terms; Digidentity
T&C: https://auth.digidentity.eu/terms and conditions/uk;
Post-Office T&C: http://www.postoffice.co.uk/terms-of-use.
50Omission of minimum liability is something that was criti-
cised about the eIDAS Regulation. See, for example, Bitkom
“Position Paper on the Proposal for an EU Regulation on
Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic
Transactions in the Internal Market”, 2013. Available
at: https://ameliaandersdotter.eu/sites/default/files/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/20130408-BITKOM-Position-on-
eID-regulation1.pdf [accessed on: 28 July 2015]
51As reported in http://www.planetbiometrics.com/article-
details/i/3994/desc/hungary-launches-biometric-eid-card/
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analysed Gov.UK Verify’s operation ac-
cording to system architecture and regulating policies. We
detailed the requirements set forth by eIDAS for eIDM oper-
ation across borders, briefly related UK system’s architecture
to that of another member state and highlighted potential
discrepancies in policy and modus operandi should the UK
wish to notify their scheme under eIDAS.
In particular, the way the system (and namely the MS
component of CH) handles pseudonymisation currently seems
incompatible with the founding Identity Assurance Princi-
ples, data protections guidelines and the goal of unlinkability.
In case pseudonyms as a de facto UID is declared to be an
intended function instead of a practical coincidence, it should
be documented exactly which needs such a function would
cover and what the associated risks would be. In fact, this
paper suggests an intended use of pseudonyms as UID for the
purposes of eIDAS could allow Gov.UK Verify to transmit
the required minimum dataset. At the same time, policy
amendments are needed to clarify how the CH processes per-
sonal data and establish minimum liability requirements for
contracting parties of the scheme. Future work is needed to
explore how additional attributes, such as biometric informa-
tion and attribute providers, should be incorporated into the
existing system in order to equate it to higher international
Levels of Assurance.
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APPENDIX
A. THE GERMAN nPA
In order to fully understand Gov.UK Verify’s operation in
a cross-border setting, we would need to look at how the sys-
tem would behave when communicating with other national
eIDM. This article opted to use the German eIDM as a ref-
erence point. The German eID system is based on the nPA,
the national ID card. The card carries a RFID chip with
an electronic version of the identifying information [25].52
The card was made a central point of the system in order to
allow for two-factor authentication that was missing from the
previous username/password implementation. The system
was designed around the premise that the set of informa-
tion necessary to identify a person (referred to as ‘sovereign
data set’)53 is qualitatively more valuable once validated
as trustworthy and, therefore, deserves greater protection
than the rest of identity information that could potentially
be voluntarily disclosed or available through commercial
services.
To safeguard the sovereign dataset the system should min-
imize the identifiers transmitted each time by allowing cre-
ation of multiple eIDs with combinations of identifiers [26].
Security is aided further by end–to–end cryptography across
all communication. The system has three main components:
the user (represented by their ID card), a card–reader at-
tached to the user’s computer and the SP. There is no IdP in
Germany’s implementation;54 instead the eID is provided by
validation of data from the card by the reader through cryp-
tographic protocols. The user and SP have to be mutually
authenticated through certificates before any data flow.55
System design is based on the fundamental privacy princi-
ples existent in German policy [6]:
(a) Right to information self-determination: The concept
describes a person’s power to decide when and within
what limits information about themselves should be
communicated to others [20]. It got constituted into
a right by a decision of the German Constitutional
52fore– and surname, address, date of birth, nationality, place
of birth, post-code, municipality ID, expiry date and (option-
ally) fingerprints. Currently no eID application in Germany
is designed to use fingerprint authentication. Additionally, se-
rial numbers for the card and the chip and a biometric photo
similar to ePassports are available to elevated governmental
terminals.
53In other literature, and some other parts of this article, this
concept is referred to as ‘transaction identity’. For more see
C. Sullivan, “Digital Identity, an Emergent Legal Concept:
The Role and Legal Nature of Digital Identity in Commercial
Transactions”. 2010: University of Adelaide Press.
54The official provider of identities in the Governments, which
produces the ID cards. The cards are produced oﬄine in
the federal printing facilities; no data need uploading on
a network for the creation of the card. After production
all data are required by law to be erased from the printing
facilities and the government has no ability to track or mon-
itor individual card usage. The cards only operate in an
oﬄine mode, meaning that all authenticating data can only
be transmitted to devices in close proximity.
55Online communication to and form the SP happens
through client software, triggered by a browser plugin.
The Government has released a multi–platform free




Court.56 In the German eID system it is manifested
through requiring the user to affirm their actions by
entering a PIN number before any transmission of eIDs
takes place.
(b) Separation of informational powers refers to the idea
that the state should not be allowed to gather personal
data as a single entity, but instead all data transfers
should be justified against clearly defined purposes for
the data collection (‘purpose–specification’) and should
be the least intrusive possible (‘proportionality’). [7].
Because of separation of informational powers, SPs have
to register with the Federal Office of Administration
before allowed to access eIDs. Registration requires
them to submit a case where they detail the specific
data fields of the eIDs they wish to access and the
corresponding service needs.
(c) Data minimization stems from the preconditions of a
lawful processing of personal data under the DPD.57
As a principle it means that a data controller should
minimise the data collection to only what is relevant
and necessary to the specific purpose of the processing.
In the German system, minimization is implemented
through the selective disclosure functions of the card:
The card is capable of answering questions of whether
a user is above a certain age or lives in a certain area
with Yes/No answers without disclosing the actual birth
of date or address. Enforcement of the minimization
principle is ensured by allowing users to de–select some
of the identifiers requested by the SP before each sub-
mission. De–selected fields do not get disclosed. There
is no minimum dataset a user has to send over, but
deselecting fields could potentially not allow the trans-
action to be completed. Nevertheless, this risk is at the
discretion of the user.
(d) Pseudonymity refers to the ability to authenticate users
without disclosing their actual identifying information.
It is a concept found in various pieces of German legis-
lation.58 Pseudonymity is built directly into the system:
for each pair eID card – SP a specific pseudonym is
created by combining a cryptographic key stored at
the card with one that each SP holds. As a result,
pseudonyms change across different uses making it im-
possible to link different activities to one user.
56Volksza¨hlung Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 15. Dezember
1983 auf die mu¨ndliche Verhandlung vom 18. und 19. Ok-
tober 1983, BVerfGE 65, 1, 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440,
484/83 in den Verfahren u¨ber die Verfassungsbeschwerden
[in German]. With the same decision the Court forbade any
future creation of any kind of UID.
57DPD arts. 6§1(b, c)
58For example, see the ‘telemedia act’ that requires telecom-
munication providers to allow users to use and pay for their
services pseudonymously: Telemediengesetz vom 26. Februar
2007 (BGBl. I S. 179).
